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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965 will be fifty years 
old. In those fifty years, at least seventy-three urban renewal districts in 
twenty-five of Idaho’s forty-four counties have sprung up across the 
state of Idaho.1 In spite of urban renewal’s longevity and proliferation in 
Idaho, it continues to face opposition in the state.2 Yet, when compared 
to other states, Idaho’s urban renewal laws have always been fairly re-
strictive of the practice.3 Furthermore, in the fifty years since its incep-
tion, the Idaho legislature has changed and, arguably, improved the way 
that urban renewal is implemented in the state. Despite these im-
provements, the implementation of Idaho’s urban renewal laws could 
benefit from minor changes. 
Part I of this article explains what urban renewal is, examines its 
history, posits that aversion to urban renewal is partly due to a turbu-
lent history that misbranded it, describes what tax increment financing 
(TIF) is, and explains how TIF became an integral part of urban renew-
al. Part II examines the legality of urban renewal and TIF in Idaho, 
demonstrates how the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled on most of the 
major legal objections to urban renewal, and predicts how that court 
would decide unaddressed legal issues relating to urban renewal in Ida-
ho. Part III explains that TIF is simultaneously successful and contro-
versial because of inherent aspects of TIF that closely map features of 
contemporary local government, surveys TIF successes and failures in 
Idaho, shows the conservative beginnings of Idaho’s TIF laws, displays 
                                                     
 
 1. E-mail and spreadsheet from Gary Houde, Senior Research Analyst, Idaho 
State Tax Commission, to author (April 18, 2014, 05:09 PST) (on file with author). 
 2. See, e.g., Randal O’Toole, Theft as Urban Renewal: Why Idaho Should Repeal 
the Local Economic Development Act, IDAHO FREEDOM FOUND. (Feb. 2011), 
http://idahofreedom.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Theft-as-Urban-Renewal-Feb-2011.pdf. 
 3. Compare Craig L. Johnson & Kenneth A. Kriz, A Review of Tax Increment Fi-
nancing Laws, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 15, 33–35, 45–
47 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001) (comparing urban renewal and TIF laws in 
the United States) with infra Part V (tracking the history of Idaho’s urban renewal statutes). 
See infra Part III. 
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how those laws have evolved to create more government accountability 
for TIF projects, and suggests minor changes that could improve TIF in 
Idaho. After the conclusion in part IV, a table in part V tracks the histo-
ry and evolution of Idaho’s urban renewal and TIF statutes. 
A. What are Urban Renewal and Tax Increment Financing? 
Black’s Law Dictionary explains that urban renewal is “[t]he pro-
cess of redeveloping urban areas by demolishing or repairing existing 
structures or by building new facilities on areas that that have been 
cleared in accordance with an overall plan.”4 Urban renewal generally 
requires that an area be blighted in order for it to be eligible for renew-
al,5 though this requirement has been significantly relaxed.6 Urban re-
newal goes by various names throughout the country. In California, ur-
ban renewal is known as redevelopment.7 Some progressive states and 
municipalities recognize the relaxation of blight requirements and simp-
ly label urban renewal economic development or development.8 Whatev-
er its label, urban renewal has been a source of controversy and criti-
cism throughout the United States.9 
Critics of urban renewal come from both ends of the political spec-
trum. In California, much of the criticism of urban renewal comes from 
the left.10 One of the most prominent liberal critics of urban renewal is 
California Governor Jerry Brown.11 Brown eliminated California’s urban 
renewal program in 2012 as an austerity measure to “try and shock vot-
ers into approving new revenues.”12 Much of the criticism of urban re-
newal in Idaho comes from the far right.13 These highly conservative 
critics and local leaders claim that urban renewal spends public funds 
without voter accountability, robs governmental entities of tax revenues, 
and does not provide significant public benefits.14 These criticisms are 
                                                     
 4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1680 (9th ed., 2011). 
 5. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2008(a) (2009 & Supp. 2013) (requiring an area to be 
a “deteriorated area” before it is eligible for urban renewal). 
 6. Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the Po-
litical Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 71 (2010). 
 7. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33000 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 11 of 
2014 Reg. Sess. and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot). 
 8. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 71; Nampa Development Corporation, THE CITY 
OF NAMPA, http://www.cityofnampa.us/index.aspx?NID=100 (last visited May 22, 2014). 
 9. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 66. 
 10. See Robert Cruickshank, Governor Brown’s Progressive Shock Doctrine Takes 
Shape, CALITICS (Jan. 4, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.calitics.com/diary/12999/governor-
browns-progressive-shock-doctrine-takes-shape. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.; Dan Walters, Dan Walters: Political Struggle Looms over Redevelopment’s 
Revival, CAL. REDEV. ASS’N. (Jan. 13, 2014), 
http://www.calredevelop.org/wcnews/newsarticledisplay.aspx?ArticleID=49. 
 13. See generally O’Toole, supra note 2. 
 14. See id; John Funk, Nampa Council Discusses Future of NDC Board, IDAHO 
PRESS-TRIB., Jan. 26, 2014, http://www.idahopress.com/members/nampa-council-discusses-
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largely addressed in parts II and III. Some criticisms of urban renewal 
are based on negative associations with historical aspects of urban re-
newal that are basically nonexistent in modern contexts.15 Thus, an un-
derstanding of urban renewal’s history adds complexity and meaning to 
the way it is viewed today. 
i. The History and Misbranding of Urban Renewal 
Federal urban renewal was first codified in Title I of the Housing 
Act of 1949.16 Title I promised large-scale revitalization of American cit-
ies through federal funding.17 It purported to offer the kind of overarch-
ing redevelopment scheme that only the federal government could sup-
ply.18 To better utilize the federal funds that flowed from Title I, Idaho 
passed the Idaho Urban Renewal Act of 1965.19 The Idaho Urban Re-
newal Act of 1965 authorized Idaho municipalities to define urban re-
newal districts20 and use federal funds to improve blighted and deterio-
rated areas within those districts.21 
Despite nationwide state passage of urban renewal acts similar to 
the Idaho Urban Renewal Act of 1965,22 support for federal urban re-
newal waned during the 1960s and 1970s.23 Critics felt that Title I’s 
“ambiguous and ill-defined” goals created uncertainty about how it 
should be implemented.24 Further, federal urban renewal encouraged 
the use of eminent domain to obtain title to massive urban areas to be 
                                                                                                                           
future-of-ndc-board/article_73acff70-8334-11e3-8e49-001a4bcf887a.html [hereinafter Nampa 
Council Discusses Future of NDC Board]. 
 15. See, e.g., infra Part I.A.i. 
 16. See Jon C. Teaford, Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath, 11 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 
443, 443 (2000), available at http://www.knowledgeplex.org/showdoc.html?id=2092. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN., ET AL., TAX INCREMENT FINANCING: FISCAL 
IMPACT OF THE BOISE CENTRAL URBAN RENEWAL DISTRICT 3 (2002) [hereinafter FISCAL 
IMPACT] (on file with author); John T. Reuter, Razed & Confused: Boise’s Turbulent History 
of Urban Renewal, BOISE WEEKLY, Aug. 4, 2010, available at 
http://www.boiseweekly.com/boise/razed-and-confused-boises-turbulent-history-of-urban-
renewal/Content?oid=1713334. 
 20. See generally Idaho Code Ann. § 50-2001–33 (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 21. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2007(k) (2009 & Supp. 2013); FISCAL IMPACT, supra 
note 19, at 3; Reuter, supra note 19. 
 22. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 33000 (West, Westlaw through 
2014 Reg. Sess. and all propositions on the 6/3/2014 ballot); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.330 (West, 
Westlaw through 2014 2nd Reg. Sess., March 31, 2014); IOWA CODE ANN. § 403.1 (West, 
Westlaw through legislation signed as of 4/11/2014 from the 2014 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 279.382 (West, Westlaw through 2013 77th Reg. Sess. and the 27th Special 
Sess.); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-31-1 (West, Westlaw through chapter 534 of the 2013 Reg. 
Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-20-201 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Second Reg. Sess.); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.81.005 (West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation). 
 23. See Teaford, supra note 16, at 454. 
 24. Id. at 445. 
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cleared for redevelopment.25 After these areas were taken, they were 
often occupied by private entities in order to spur economic develop-
ment.26 Federal urban renewal also had little regard for historically sig-
nificant buildings, which, because of the age of such buildings, often fell 
neatly into definitions of blight.27 Finally, and perhaps most damning, 
Title I “modified the programs set up under the 1937 Housing Act by 
conditioning funding for slum clearance projects on affording ‘maximum 
opportunity’ to private developers and by allowing slum areas to be re-
developed with other than low income housing.”28 This meant that many 
low-income urban residents, which were predominantly racial minori-
ties, were forced out of their housing.29 Such effects quickly found disfa-
vor among private property owners,30 historical preservationists,31 and 
civil rights advocates.32 The United States Supreme Court upheld and 
perpetuated federal urban renewal and its effects as part of the police 
power with its decision in Berman v. Parker.33 The Berman Court stat-
ed, “It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the com-
munity should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, 
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.” 34  Ultimately, however, 
Congress decreased the scale of and funding for federal urban renewal 
by integrating it into the Great Society’s Model Cities scheme in 1974.35 
Even though eminent domain is rarely used for urban renewal in 
modern contexts, urban renewal continues to carry the stigma of emi-
nent domain in Idaho.36 The United States Supreme Court’s 2005 deci-
sion in Kelo v. City of New London, which allowed local governments to 
use eminent domain for economic development purposes,37 exacerbated 
                                                     
 25. See Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 URBAN 
LAWYER 423, 437–38 (2010). 
 26. See generally Boise Redev. Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d 575, 578, 94 
Idaho 876, 879 (1972) (stating the redevelopment agency’s plan was “to clear the area and 
thereafter permit private enterprise, on a bid basis, to construct and occupy certain of the 
buildings planned for the area”). 
 27. George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic Devel-
opment: Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School Dis-
tricts, 83 TUL. L. REV. 45, 61 (2008). 
 28. Lavine, supra note 25, at 472, 442. 
 29. Id. at 424. 
 30. See Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d at 577, 94 Idaho at 878. The plaintiffs in Yick 
Kong claimed that a taking that incidentally benefitted private developers was not a public 
use. Id. 
 31. Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 61; Reuter, supra note 19. 
 32. Lavine, supra note 25, at 472. 
 33.  See Lavine, supra note 25, at 423–24. 
 34.  Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
 35.  Teaford, supra note 16, at 459. 
 36. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701A (2009 & Supp. 2013). This section was passed in 
direct response to the Supreme Court’s holding in Kelo. Kimberly M. Watt, Eminent Domain, 
Regulatory Takings, and Legislative Responses in the Post-Kelo Northwest, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 
539, 539 (2007). 
 37. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005); Watt, supra note 
36, at 539. 
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critics’ disfavor for urban renewal.38 Polls taken at the time of the deci-
sion indicated that over 90% of Americans disagreed with the opinion 
and 67% of registered voters wanted to limit the power of eminent do-
main.39 Idaho was not exempt from this unpopular view of Kelo. In di-
rect response to Kelo, the Idaho legislature enacted Idaho Code section 
7-701A in 2006 “to provide limitations on eminent domain for private 
parties, urban renewal or economic development purposes.”40 Because of 
urban renewal’s connection with economic development and history of 
using eminent domain, critics of urban renewal continue to associate it 
with eminent domain and the negative stigma of the Kelo ruling. How-
ever, eminent domain has become a relatively underutilized process for 
obtaining property for urban renewal in Idaho.41 In a 2010 Boise Weekly 
article, Phil Kushlan, then executive director of Boise’s urban renewal 
agency, said, “in the old days we used eminent domain a lot, and we 
haven't used it since 1980.”42 Although limitations such as Idaho Code 
section 7-701A likely contribute to this underutilization, it is more likely 
due to the administrative and political burdens of pushing an eminent 
domain proceeding through the public hearings required for urban re-
newal.43 Regardless, though eminent domain is still available to urban 
renewal agencies (URAs), negatively associating urban renewal with 
eminent domain does not make sense in Idaho where URAs rarely use 
eminent domain. 
Critics also continue to associate urban renewal with the destruc-
tion of historical buildings.44 Indeed, in the heyday of federal urban re-
newal and “large-scale, federally funded clearance projects” this was a 
warranted association. 45  In Idaho, Boise fell subject to this “heavy-
handed” style of urban renewal.46 In the 1970s, Boise’s URA tore down 
Boise’s Chinatown and attempted to demolish several historical build-
ings. 47  However, as federal urban renewal wound down, historical 
preservation became popular and federal tax laws were adjusted to fa-
vor rehabilitation of aged buildings.48 In Boise, former Boise Mayor Dirk 
Kempthorne spearheaded locating the Boise Town Square Mall four 
miles outside of downtown instead of in the place of several historical 
                                                     
 38. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7-701A (2009 & Supp. 2013); Ilya Somin, The Limits of 
Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009). 
 39. Watt, supra note 36, at 539. 
 40. H.R. 555, 58th Leg., 2nd Sess., Statement of Purpose (Idaho 2006). 
 41. Telephone Interview with Melinda Anderson, Economic Development Director, 
City of Twin Falls, Idaho (Mar. 3, 2014) (notes on file with author); Telephone Interview with 
Ryan P. Armbruster, Shareholder, Elam & Burke, & Meghan S. Conrad, Associate, Elam & 
Burke (Feb. 27, 2014) (notes on file with author). 
 42. Reuter, supra note 19. 
 43. Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 80–81 
 44. O’Toole, supra note 2; Reuter, supra note 19. 
 45. Teaford, supra note 16, at 461. 
 46. Reuter, supra note 19. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Teaford, supra note 16, at 461. 
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downtown buildings and encouraged renovation instead of destruction;49 
this changed the attitude of urban renewal in Boise. According to Boise 
Weekly, “[U]rban renewal in Boise has treated the city's history with 
respect and has restored almost as much of the city as it decimated in 
the 1970s.”50 Boise’s URA now focuses on “supporting the reuse of his-
toric buildings and re-creating traditional downtown streetscapes.” 51 
Indeed, the Boise URA and Idaho URAs in general now encourage his-
torical preservation rather than destruction. Considering this role-
reversal, associating urban renewal with the destruction of historical 
buildings is not rational. 
Though perhaps not as much as states with large populations of ra-
cial minorities, Idaho also experienced the racially discriminatory effects 
of federal urban renewal. As already mentioned, Boise’s URA decimated 
Boise’s Chinatown, “destroying not just buildings, but what remained of 
a community, too.”52 Congress’s passage of the Widnall Amendment to 
the Housing Act in 1966 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968 helped limit 
the discriminatory effects of federal urban renewal.53 Local governments 
have also sought to mitigate the discriminatory impacts of modern ur-
ban renewal.54 Contemporary “state and local governments are . . . more 
aware of the discriminatory impacts of redevelopment than they were . . 
. [and] have taken steps to improve the fairness of the redevelopment 
process by making it more transparent and by improving relocation as-
sistance programs.”55 Despite these changes, many critics believe that 
urban renewal still imposes disproportionate burdens on poor communi-
ties and minorities.56 However, if used correctly, urban renewal need not 
bear this stigma. When urban renewal is used without the power of em-
inent domain, as in Idaho, the burdens it imposes on poor and minority 
communities are drastically reduced if not eliminated.57 
ii. The Emergence and Proliferation of Tax Increment Financing 
With less federal funding after federal urban renewal was elimi-
nated in the 1970s, states were forced to independently fund their urban 
renewal projects.58 Many states turned to tax abatements, incentive zon-
ing, and direct grants.59 In California, where bonds for urban renewal 
required hard-to-obtain voter approval, local governments began using 
tax increment financing as a way to provide more funding for urban re-
                                                     
 49. Reuter, supra note 19. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Lavine, supra note 25, at 472. 
 54. See id. at 473. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 473–74. 
 57. See id. at 475.  
 58. Teaford, supra note 16, at 460. 
 59. Id. 
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newal.60 Initially, TIF grew slowly; in the late 1970s there were just 
twenty-six TIF areas in California and six other states where TIF was 
authorized.61 But between 1980 and 1990, the number of TIF areas in 
California more than doubled, increasing from 299 to 658.62 Twenty-
eight other states had authorized TIF by 1984.63 This number increased 
to thirty-three by 1987 and forty-four by 1992.64 Today, TIF is author-
ized in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia.65 By far, TIF has 
become the most widespread urban renewal financing mechanism in the 
country.66 Idaho adopted TIF in 1988 with the passage of The Local 
Economic Development Act.67 
Studies suggest there are many thousands of TIF districts nation-
wide.68 In 2003, Wisconsin had 789 TIF districts, Missouri had at least 
291 TIF districts in 2007, and Iowa had a staggering 2,400 TIF districts 
“covering 7.1[%] of the urban tax base” in 1999.69 California had upward 
of 10% of its property tax base included in a TIF district in 2001.70 In 
Idaho, 3.9% of property taxes went to Idaho URAs statewide in 2009.71 
In 2013, there were seventy-three urban renewal districts in twenty-five 
of Idaho’s forty-four counties.72  
The proliferation of TIF has paralleled the evolution of urban re-
newal.73 As TIF became the most widely used financing tool for urban 
renewal, urban renewal evolved to allow local governments to develop 
unblighted areas.74 As previously mentioned, urban renewal came to be 
used not only to redevelop dilapidated, deteriorated areas, but also to 
develop unblighted areas.75 To accommodate the evolution of urban re-
newal, state legislatures have relaxed definitions of blight.76 As state 
courts have largely deferred to legislatures’ proffered definitions of 
blight, findings of blight have become merely a formality. 77  Sixteen 
states have abolished the need for a blight finding altogether.78 TIF is a 
                                                     
 60. Briffault, supra note 6, at 69. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 70. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. California repealed its TIF statute in 2012. Walters, supra note 12. Arizona 
is the other state without a TIF program. Briffault, supra note 6, at 70. To the knowledge of 
the author, no other states have repealed or enacted TIF statutes since Richard Briffault 
published this article in 2010. 
 66. Teaford, supra note 16, at 460. 
 67. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2901 (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 68. Briffault, supra note 6, at 70. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. O’Toole, supra note 2.  
 72. E-mail and spreadsheet from Gary Houde, supra note 1. 
 73. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 71. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 71–72. 
 78. Id. 
2014] WHAT’S THE TIFF ABOUT TIF? 281 
 
major reason for this evolution. While TIF can work in blighted areas, it 
is most effective in unblighted areas.79 
TIF’s prevalence not only demonstrates its suitability to local eco-
nomic development, but also its place as a necessary tool for municipali-
ties.80 Without federal funding from Title I, states needed a way to fi-
nance urban renewal and economic development.81 TIF filled that void.82 
Idaho cities almost exclusively use TIF to finance urban renewal.83 In 
Idaho, TIF laws are intertwined with urban renewal laws. Definitions 
and procedures from Idaho’s urban renewal laws are incorporated into 
Idaho’s TIF laws.84 The remainder of this article will focus mostly on 
TIF. However, because TIF is almost exclusively used for urban renewal 
in Idaho,85 when this article refers to the use of TIF, it will also be refer-
encing the practice of urban renewal and vice versa. 
iii. The Basic Structure of Tax Increment Financing 
TIF begins with the creation of an urban renewal agency.86 The 
agency then forms TIF districts where TIF funds will be allocated.87 
Once an agency forms a district, the property tax value within the dis-
trict is assessed and set.88 The assessed value is the set base value.89 
Property taxes in the district are levied as usual, and the set base value 
continues to go to the various taxing entities, such as municipalities, 
counties, school districts, and fire districts.90  As property tax values 
within the TIF district increase, the agency receives any property tax 
revenues that exceed the set base value and uses them to make im-
provements to the TIF district.91 These excess revenues are the incre-
ment in tax increment financing. Improvements include the construc-
tion of public facilities, infrastructure, or other economic development.92 
Urban renewal agencies can implement TIF by paying for improvements 
as the TIF district produces increment or by leveraging bonds that are 
used to fund improvements.93 In the latter situation, the improvements 
increase property tax revenues, the increment of which is used to repay 
                                                     
 79. Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 67–73. 
 80. J. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing, in TAX 
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 15. 
 81. Teaford, supra note 16, at 460. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Telephone Interview with Ryan Armbruster & Meghan Conrad, supra note 41. 
 84. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2903(2), (8)(c), (12), -2906(1), (3), -2909(1)(c), 
(3) (2009 & Supp. 2013) (referencing the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965). 
 85. Telephone Interview Ryan Armbruster & Meghan Conrad, supra note 41. 
 86. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006(a) (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 87. Briffault, supra note 6, at 67. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 67–68. 
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the bonds.94 TIF bonds thus allow municipalities to “jumpstart the rede-
velopment process.”95 As bonds or project costs are paid off, the project is 
wound down and incremental revenues are eventually returned to the 
taxing entities.96 
Broadly speaking, TIF can be divided into five phases.97 The first 
phase is the project initiation phase. During this phase, a city identifies 
an area as blighted or underdeveloped and forms an urban renewal 
agency to address the problem.98 The second phase is the plan formula-
tion phase. In this phase, the urban renewal agency forms a TIF plan 
that sets out the municipality’s blight finding, the urban renewal area, 
and other aspects important to the community and the success of the 
project.99 The third phase is the plan adoption phase. During this phase, 
the urban renewal agency subjects the plan to various participatory 
mechanisms that allow the public and affected taxing entities to become 
familiar with and object to the TIF plan.100 If the plan is adopted at the 
plan adoption phase, it is then implemented. The plan implementation 
phase is the fourth phase and includes property value assessment, tax 
increment allocation to the urban renewal agency, and physical plan 
execution.101 As the plan is implemented, “it should be subject to evalua-
tion and set to terminate within a specified time.”102 This is the fifth and 
final TIF phase: evaluation and termination. Throughout all phases of 
the project, agencies should operate transparently. 
After part II discusses the legality of TIF, part III examines the 
status of Idaho’s TIF laws and improvements the Idaho legislature could 
make to these laws in relation to each of the project phases.103 
II. THE LEGALITY OF URBAN RENEWAL AND TAX INCREMENT 
FINANCING 
Because urban renewal is implemented on a state-by-state basis, it 
is subject to state constitutional and statutory restrictions. Accordingly, 
urban renewal opponents have sought to undermine urban renewal’s 
legality by arguing that it violates certain state constitutional and stat-
utory restrictions.104 While these arguments are used against TIF today, 
they are generally the same arguments used against the revenue bonds 
                                                     
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. J. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing, in TAX 
INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 16. 
 97. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 3, at 32.  
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. A table showing the project phases and the way that different elements of each 
phase is and has been addressed in Idaho is available in the appendix. Infra Part V. 
104. See Boise Redev. Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 499 P.2d 575, 579–83, 94 Idaho 
876, 880–84 (1972). 
2014] WHAT’S THE TIFF ABOUT TIF? 283 
 
that funded urban renewal before TIF existed (with the exception of the 
argument that TIF is often not the “but for” causation of develop-
ment).105 Thus, while one of the cases discussed in this section refers to 
revenue bonds, the arguments made against revenue bonds are equally 
applicable to TIF. These arguments assert that urban renewal violates 
constitutional restrictions and principles of statutory construction. 106 
While the Idaho Supreme Court has not ruled on all of these arguments, 
this section explains how it has ruled on some of them and seeks to pre-
dict how it might rule on others. 
A. Constitutional Restrictions 
Most of the constitutional arguments against TIF stem from consti-
tutional limits on public spending, such as restrictions on municipali-
ties’ ability to incur debt and requirements that expenditure of munici-
pal funds be limited to public purposes. These limits on public spending 
originated in the 1830s when states sought to replicate the success the 
Erie Canal had in stimulating New York’s economy by sponsoring mas-
sive amounts of state-funded infrastructure development.107 Large-scale 
projects such as “turnpikes, canals, and railroads” sprang up all over the 
country.108 Unfortunately, many private developers were unable to re-
pay the money borrowed from states to make these improvements.109 
The states in turn had trouble repaying their debtors and several de-
faulted on their loans.110 As a result, many states revised their constitu-
tions to prevent municipalities from incurring debt without voter ap-
proval111 and to require that funds must be spent in furtherance of a 
public purpose.112 
i. Restraints on Cities’ Ability to Incur Indebtedness without Voter 
Approval 
Much of the controversy over TIF stems from the fact that TIF 
bonds are usually entered into without voter approval.113 Whether TIF 
bonds require voter approval depends on whether they are more like 
revenue bonds or general obligation bonds.114 Revenue bonds are repaid 
solely by funds produced by a specified revenue-generating source asso-
ciated with the bonds.115 Similarly, TIF bonds are repaid by incremental 
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increases in property tax revenues that come from revenue-generating 
sources in a specific area associated with the bonds.116 General obliga-
tion bonds are backed by the full faith and credit of the city and repaid 
from the city’s treasury.117 TIF bonds are similar to general obligation 
bonds because TIF bonds are repaid using money that would otherwise 
go to the city treasury.118 Through judicial interpretation and constitu-
tional amendment, revenue bonds have generally been found to be ex-
empt from constitutional limitations on incurring debt without voter 
approval.119 Thus, if TIF bonds are more like revenue bonds, they may 
be exempt from constitutional restrictions on incurring debt without 
voter approval.120 However, if TIF bonds are more like general obliga-
tion bonds, they likely violate such restrictions if they are used without 
voter approval.121 In states that have no laws exempting TIF bonds from 
state constitutional restrictions on incurring debt, courts have split over 
whether TIF bonds are akin to revenue bonds or general obligation 
bonds.122 However, most states avoid interpreting whether they should 
treat TIF bonds as though they are revenue bonds or general obligation 
bonds by exempting TIF bonds themselves from state constitutional re-
straints on incurring debt without voter approval.123 This can be accom-
plished by judicial or legislative declaration that urban renewal agen-
cies, as authorities independent of municipalities, are not subject to debt 
limits.124 
The Idaho Supreme Court made such a declaration in Boise Rede-
velopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp.125 There, the Boise Redevelopment 
Agency (BRA) sought to purchase property from the Yick Kong Corpora-
tion for the purpose of urban renewal.126 Negotiations between the two 
parties broke down, and the BRA pursued condemnation of the proper-
ty.127 The trial court granted the BRA’s condemnation of the property.128 
The Yick Kong Corporation appealed, claiming that the revenue bonds 
(this case was decided before Idaho used TIF) the BRA used to finance 
its projects were invalid because article VIII, section 3 of the Idaho Con-
stitution prevents cities from incurring debt without taxpayer approv-
al.129 
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The Yick Kong Corporation asserted that the BRA was the alter 
ego of the city and was therefore subject to the same constitutional re-
strictions on incurring debt that the city was, and that, by issuing reve-
nue bonds, the BRA—and thus the city—had violated article VIII, sec-
tion 3 of the Idaho Constitution.130 The Yick Kong Corporation based 
this assertion on the city’s ability to appoint and remove agency com-
missioners and approve and deny agency projects.131 The Idaho Supreme 
Court dismissed these arguments, noting that (1) the city’s ability to 
appoint and remove commissioners was not absolute and thus did not 
confer excessive control and (2) the city’s ability to approve and deny 
projects was necessary to provide a local voice in the BRA’s opera-
tions.132 The court concluded that the URA was not “the alter ego of the 
City of Boise,” that “[t]he degree of control exercised by the City of Boise 
[did] not usurp the powers and duties of the [BRA],” and that “the close 
association between the two entities at most show[ed] two independent 
public entities closely cooperating for valid public purposes.”133 
In 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the Yick Kong hold-
ing in Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg v. Hart.134 In Hart, 
the City of Rexburg’s urban renewal agency planned to use TIF bonds to 
construct a public outdoor swimming facility, a sporting and community 
events building, and outdoor fields.135 Kenneth Hart, a Rexburg citizen 
filing a pro se appearance, challenged the constitutionality of the TIF 
bonds.136 Hart made the same argument as the Yick Kong Corporation—
that urban renewal agencies are the alter egos of cities and are there-
fore subject to the same state constitutional limits on incurring debt 
without voter approval as cities.137 Hart claimed that the Rexburg URA, 
as the alter ego of the city, could not issue TIF bonds to finance its pro-
ject because such financing would amount to the city incurring debt 
without voter approval.138 
Hart further argued that two amendments to the Idaho Urban Re-
newal Law of 1965 made subsequent to Yick Kong validated the alter-
ego argument.139 The first of these amendments allowed a city to ap-
point itself as its own urban renewal agency board both at the outset of 
the URA’s formation and by terminating an existing board.140 The sec-
ond amendment removed language that prevented a URA board mem-
ber from holding any other public office in the municipality of the 
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URA.141 Hart claimed that these amendments increased the amount of 
control cities exercised over URAs, thus making URAs the alter egos of 
cities.142 
The trial court found that the TIF bonds were constitutional.143 
Hart appealed the ruling and nine other Idaho URAs filed a brief as 
amici curiae, asking the Idaho Supreme Court to affirm the trial court’s 
holding.144 The Idaho Supreme Court maintained that URAs are not the 
alter egos of cities.145 The court noted that the amendments did not in-
crease cities’ control over URAs: 
[E]ven if the city governing body does appoint itself, the com-
missioners [including those who hold other public offices in the 
URA’s municipality] “shall, in all respects when acting as an ur-
ban renewal agency, be acting as an arm of state government, 
entirely separate and distinct from the municipality, to achieve, 
perform and accomplish the public purposes prescribed and pro-
vided by said urban renewal law of 1965.”146 
The court held, “Even as amended, the Law does not allow a city to 
usurp the powers and duties of the urban renewal agency.”147 
The holdings in Yick Kong and Hart thus make it clear that the 
Idaho Supreme Court does not think that urban renewal and TIF violate 
constitutional restraints on cities’ ability to incur indebtedness without 
voter approval. 
ii. Restraints Limiting Expenditure of Tax Dollars to Public Purposes 
State courts strictly interpreted what constituted a public purpose 
for the expenditure of tax dollars from the time public purpose require-
ments were instituted in the 1830s and 1840s up until the 1930s.148 
With the onset of the Great Depression, however, state courts increas-
ingly upheld programs that issued bonds to catalyze development.149 
These efforts to counteract the effects of the Great Depression led to the 
erosion of public purpose requirements.150 By the end of the twentieth 
century, nearly all state courts had upheld the constitutionality of one 
form or another of funding for private economic development through 
revenue bonds.151 Although public purpose restrictions are still preva-
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lent today, state courts are very deferential to state legislatures’ defini-
tions of what a public purpose is.152 This often means that state consti-
tutions’ public purpose restrictions on the expenditure of tax dollars are, 
for the most part, ornamental.153 
Article VIII, sections 2 and 4, and article 12, section 4 of the Idaho 
Constitution contain Idaho’s public purpose requirement.154 The Idaho 
Supreme Court also announced a public purpose requirement in Idaho 
Water Resource Board v. Kramer, noting that a public purpose is one 
“that serves to benefit the community as a whole and which is directly 
related to the functions of government.”155 In Yick Kong, the Yick Kong 
Corporation also asserted that the City of Boise had violated Idaho’s 
public purpose requirement by lending credit to the URA, which it as-
serted was a private entity.156 The court held that the Boise URA was 
engaged in a public purpose.157 The court noted that the URA, “being a 
public and not a private enterprise, [did] not fall within the strictures 
and prohibition of Article 8, Section 4 and Article 12, Section 4 of the 
Idaho Constitution.”158  
Additionally, because judicial treatment of what constitutes a pub-
lic purpose for the expenditure of tax dollars is similar to what consti-
tutes a public use in an eminent domain proceeding,159 the Yick Kong 
court’s discussion of why the taking of property involved in the case was 
for a public use is instructive. The court found that the state “may legit-
imately protect the public from disease, crime, and perhaps even deteri-
oration, blight and ugliness” through urban renewal.160 The court also 
found that so long as the benefit that the URA tenders is predominately 
public, and private benefit is incidental, urban renewal should be 
deemed a public purpose.161 Finally, the court held that economic devel-
opment is generally incidental to the predominantly public purpose of 
urban renewal.162 
To take the similarity between what constitutes a public purpose 
for the expenditure of tax dollars and what constitutes a public use in 
an eminent domain proceeding to its logical end would mean that, after 
Kelo, the Idaho Supreme Court could technically announce that urban 
renewal that is predominately driven by private economic development 
is a public purpose,163 thus allowing for the expenditure of tax dollars. 
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This reasoning is in line with current state interpretations of what con-
stitutes a public purpose for the expenditure of tax dollars.164 
B. Statutory Restrictions 
While TIF statutory schemes have many restrictions, two re-
strictions that go to the very core of how and why TIF is used ask 
whether the area in which development is proposed is blighted and 
whether the proposed development would have occurred without the use 
of TIF incentives (a “but for” requirement).165 
i. Is the Area Blighted? 
Most states’ urban renewal statutes require that there be a finding 
of blight before TIF bonds can be used to finance urban renewal.166 
However, state legislatures have redefined and broadened the meaning 
of blight to include areas that are more underdeveloped than blighted.167 
The definition of blight in Idaho urban renewal and TIF laws has 
remained largely the same since the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965 
and the Local Economic Development Act of 1987 were enacted. There 
are definitions of blight in each of these chapters.168 Both chapters use 
the term deteriorated rather than blighted.169 Idaho Code subsection 50-
2018(8) sets out the specific requirements for an area to be considered 
deteriorated for the purposes of urban renewal.170 This subsection was 
amended in 2006 and 2011.171 Idaho Code subsection 50-2903(8) sets out 
requirements for an area to be considered deteriorated for the purposes 
of a TIF project.172 These requirements are largely the same as those in 
subsection 50-2018(8).173 The two subsections are used concurrently174 
and the legislature has similarly amended them throughout the 
years.175 Because the language in subsection 50-2903(8) is much more 
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current and subsection 50-2903(8) is likely the subsection an urban re-
newal agency would use when making a blight finding, I will use this 
subsection to explain Idaho’s blight requirement. 
The broadest sections of 50-2903(8) allow a finding of deterioration 
in any area in which there is a 
predominance of defective or inadequate street layout, faulty lot 
layout . . . , diversity of ownership, . . . defective or unusual con-
ditions of title, . . . or any combination of such factors [that] re-
sults in economic underdevelopment of the area, substantially 
impairs or arrests the sound growth of a municipality, retards 
the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an eco-
nomic or social liability and is a menace to the public health, 
safety, morals or welfare in its present condition and use.176 
This subsection also specifies that such an area may be an open ar-
ea.177  The most significant amendments to subsection 50-2903(8) oc-
curred in 1994 and 2011.178 While the 1994 amendment broadened the 
definition of blight, the 2011 amendment narrowed the definition. The 
1994 amendment added subsection 50-2908(8)(e), which makes any area 
that is economically disadvantaged because of its close proximity to the 
border of an adjacent state a deteriorated area. 179  This subsection 
broadened the definition of a deteriorated area to include areas that 
may not meet any of the definitions of a deteriorated area but are mere-
ly economically disadvantaged by virtue of their proximity to a state 
border.180 The 2011 amendment sought to limit the definition of a dete-
riorated area by exempting agricultural and forest land. 181  Although 
this amendment technically narrowed the definition of blight, it is un-
likely any urban renewal agency would seek to establish an urban re-
newal district on agricultural or forest land without the land first being 
zoned for other purposes. 
State courts have encouraged the broadening of blight definitions 
by legislatures by largely deferring to legislatures’ definitions of 
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blight.182 Such was the case in Yick Kong183 The Yick Kong Corporation 
challenged the finding of blight in the condemned area, where there 
were sixty-five buildings, forty-five of which were deemed “defective,” 
and seven parcels with no buildings on them.184 The court held that, be-
cause the structures and other improvements in the area were predomi-
nately defective, the area was deteriorating.185 The court’s holding rest-
ed largely on deference to the Idaho legislature’s definition of deterio-
rated.186 The court stated, “The definitions contained in I.C. s[ection] 50-
2018 are, in our view, sufficiently precise to give adequate guidelines to 
the local governing body.”187 
ii. Would the Development Have Occurred without TIF Subsidies? 
Conceptually, TIF would not be a viable source of financing eco-
nomic development if the development it seeks to attract would have 
occurred just as easily without TIF subsidies.188 Thus, several states 
require that TIF plans cannot be approved unless the development 
would not have occurred “but for” the TIF subsidies offered to develop-
ers.189 
An explicit “but for” requirement is absent from Idaho’s TIF and 
urban renewal statutes.190 However, Idaho Code section 50-2905(3) re-
quires that a TIF plan include an “economic feasibility study.”191 Though 
the statute does not specify what an “economic feasibility study” should 
include,192 conceivably, a TIF project would not be economically feasible 
if the development it seeks to attract would have located in the TIF dis-
trict without any TIF subsidies. Furthermore, it seems to have become a 
best practice of sorts among Idaho municipalities not to approve a TIF 
plan unless it meets a “but for” standard.193 
Idaho is not alone in its lack of a “but for” requirement. In 2008, on-
ly nineteen states applied a “but for” requirement.194 Like the statutory 
blight requirement, courts have become less stringent in applying the 
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“but for” requirement.195 Although some TIF projects have been struck 
down because they did not meet the “but for” threshold, courts are gen-
erally deferential to municipalities’ determinations of “but for” causa-
tion, even when such determinations are “debatable and even concluso-
ry.”196 This may be because it can be very difficult to determine if devel-
opment would have happened without TIF subsidies.197 Still, deference 
to local determinations of “but for” causation can be detrimental to 
communities implementing TIF. A lack of “but for” causation could 
mean that the URA or municipality is using TIF purely to garner its 
increments, without concern for TIF’s ability to bring benefits to a com-
munity.198 Although “but for” standards are “usually very low hurdles 
and not uniformly or rigorously applied,”199 Idaho could help prevent 
purely tax-driven TIF projects by making its “but for” standard explicit 
and explaining exactly what an “economic feasibility study” should in-
clude. 
Because Idaho does not have an explicit “but for” standard and rig-
orous application of the standard has fallen by the wayside, it is very 
difficult to determine how the Idaho Supreme Court would decide a “but 
for” challenge to a TIF project under Idaho’s current TIF statutes. On 
one hand, the lack of an explicit “but for” standard in Idaho’s TIF stat-
utes and lax application of the standard in general seem to imply that 
the court likely would not strike down a TIF project with a weak show-
ing of “but for” causation. On the other hand, if a “but for” challenge 
presented facts extremely indicative of a lack of “but for” causation, the 
court might strike down a TIF project for failing to create an economi-
cally feasible plan. 
III. WHY TAX INCREMENT FINANCING SUCCEEDS AND WHY IT 
IS CONTROVERSIAL 
Although urban renewal has managed to thrive in the Idaho legal 
system for the past fifty years,200 Idahoans continue to resent its exist-
ence as a part of our local government system.201 The success and con-
troversy of TIF in Idaho and elsewhere is largely attributable to its abil-
ity to play off of aspects of local government.202 In a 2010 article, Colum-
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bia University Law Professor Richard Briffault writes, “TIF succeeds—
in the sense of its ubiquitous adoption and use—because it maps pre-
cisely onto the principal features of contemporary local government. So, 
too, TIF is controversial because it exacerbates some of the basic ten-
sions in our local government structure and policies.” 203  Professor 
Briffault specifically identifies four inherent aspects of TIF that, while 
making TIF successful, also aggravate tensions in local politics and eco-
nomics: 
TIF succeeds . . . because it, like local government more general-
ly, is highly decentralized; reflects and reinforces the fiscaliza-
tion of development policy; plays off the fragmentation of local 
governments and the resulting interlocal struggle for invest-
ment; and fits well with the entrepreneurial spirit characteristic 
of contemporary local economic development policy. A better un-
derstanding of TIF contributes to a better understanding of the 
political economy of American local government.204 
Such an understanding—of the interplay between TIF and local 
government politics—is important to Idahoans’ understanding of TIF 
and its evolving purposes. This section explains how the inherent as-
pects of TIF that Professor Briffault identifies cause TIF to succeed and 
how they can also cause problems. This section also highlights changes 
that the Idaho legislature has made and could make to Idaho’s TIF laws. 
While these changes certainly cannot eliminate the problems TIF cre-
ates, they can mitigate them. 
A. TIF is Decentralized like Local Government 
More so than federal and state governments, municipalities have a 
unique connection to their constituencies. Local governments need the 
ability to make economic development decisions based on the unique 
conditions, needs, and desires of their location and citizens.205 Unlike 
federal urban renewal, which restricted local control over economic de-
velopment by conditioning receipt of federal funding on compliance with 
federal regulations,206 with TIF, local governments are given a large 
amount of control over each aspect of a TIF project.207 
As already noted, TIF’s proliferation has been astounding.208 One 
major reason TIF has experienced so much success is the decentraliza-
tion of authority to implement TIF projects.209 The federal government 
                                                     
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. See id. at 85. 
206. See id. at 69; Teaford, supra note 16, at 445. 
207. Briffault, supra note 6, at 85–86. 
208. See supra Part I.A.ii. 
209. Briffault, supra note 6, at 84–86. 
2014] WHAT’S THE TIFF ABOUT TIF? 293 
 
does not have anything to do with TIF implementation.210 State gov-
ernments provide broad boundaries in which local governments make 
most major decisions about how TIF will work within their municipali-
ties.211 Local governments are able to decide TIF district boundaries, 
what kind of development to pursue, and what kind of infrastructure to 
place in TIF districts.212 By vesting decision-making power in local gov-
ernments, TIF allows local governments to shape the future of their 
municipalities.213 
The City of Nampa’s construction of the Idaho Center is one exam-
ple of an Idaho community seeking to shape a distinct urban develop-
ment vision. The Idaho Center was conceptualized by the Urban Re-
newal Agency of the City of Nampa, which was formed in 1994, just 
three years before the Idaho Center was constructed in 1997.214 As Ida-
ho’s second largest city, just twenty miles west of Boise, the agency en-
visioned Nampa competing with Boise for tourism and entertainment 
dollars.215 The complex would be the home of the Snake River Stampede, 
one of the largest rodeos in the nation, and the Idaho Stampede, Idaho’s 
first semi-professional basketball team.216 It would also host large con-
certs, rallies, and meetings.217 The outdoor horse center would “accom-
modate[] a wide range of horse events.”218 In addition to these large-
scale events, the complex would host college and high school sport com-
petitions, high school and college graduations, community fundraisers, 
trade shows, and various other community events.219 The Nampa URA 
hoped bringing these events to the complex would “[e]nhance Nampa’s 
community image / identity” by “putting Nampa on the map,” providing 
a “[s]ense of community pride,” causing Nampa to be “viewed as a pro-
gressive community,” and sending the message that “Nampa is good 
enough to support amenities.”220 
The Idaho Center succeeded in achieving this vision. A benefits 
analysis of the Idaho Center and the North Nampa Urban Renewal Area 
published in 2004, the year the urban renewal area closed, states the 
Idaho Center “[e]nhances quality of life [and] . . . the Treasure Valley’s 
image as a major regional center” and “[r]einforces Nampa’s image and 
importance within the region.”221 While these qualitative benefits were 
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important factors in the decision to form the North Nampa Urban Re-
newal Area of which the Idaho Center was a part,222 Nampa’s urban re-
newal agency also hoped to spur development and increase the tax base 
in the then barren north Nampa.223 The Idaho Center largely succeeded 
in this aspect as well. The benefits analysis estimates that the Idaho 
Center had succeeded in catalyzing approximately $31.3 million in di-
rect and indirect contributions to the Nampa area economy between 
2000 and 2004.224 The tax increment of the North Nampa Urban Re-
newal Area increased by 88% in 1996, 86% in 1997, and 59% in 1998.225 
When the area closed in 2004, property taxes in the area were nearly 
eight times what they were before the area was formed.226 Property tax-
es for agricultural land near the Idaho Center increased in value from 
$2000 per acre in 1995 to $300,000 per acre when the area closed.227 
Furthermore, after the construction of the Idaho Center, a plethora of 
businesses settled in the area. Before the urban renewal area closed in 
2004, prominent businesses such as the Idaho Center Auto Mall, an 
enormous collection of car dealerships that sits on nearly forty-two acres 
and employs over 408 people,228 and the College of Western Idaho, a 
small community college with over 10,000 students and nearly 900 em-
ployees, had settled near the Idaho Center.229 Businesses have contin-
ued to build in the area after the urban renewal area closed. The Nampa 
Gateway Center, a large commercial property whose major tenants in-
clude Sports Authority, Macy’s, Edwards Theatres, Discount Tire, and 
JC Penney, opened near the Idaho Center in 2007.230 
i. Creating Oversight through Participatory Mechanisms 
Although the decentralization of TIF has facilitated its prolifera-
tion and cities’ ability to respond to the needs of communities and shape 
a development vision,231 it also means that there is little uniform over-
sight of cities’ use of TIF.232 As previously mentioned, state governments 
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provide broad boundaries in which local governments make most major 
decisions about how TIF will work within their municipalities.233 Thus, 
cities are basically trusted to use TIF responsibly and efficiently without 
any checks in place to prevent them from failing to do so.234 This has led 
to concern for TIF projects with no accountability measures that fail “to 
produce net benefits for all affected taxing entities.”235 
States have sought to mitigate this problem by adding citizen and 
entity participatory mechanisms that take place during the plan adop-
tion phase.236 The most prevalent citizen participatory mechanism is the 
requirement that municipalities hold public hearings before creating a 
TIF district or approving a TIF plan.237 In 2001, forty-two of the forty-
eight states then authorized to use TIF required public hearings both 
before a district was created and before a plan was adopted.238 In 2008, 
forty-six of the forty-nine states that authorized TIF required hearings 
to create a TIF district.239 Another citizen participatory mechanism, the 
formation of citizens’ councils, is required in some states.240 This mech-
anism requires a citizens’ council to approve or modify a proposed TIF 
plan before the TIF project can go forward.241 
Some states require URAs to satisfy taxing entity participatory 
measures before a district or plan can be approved, such as consultation 
with the other taxing entities affected by a TIF plan.242 The most re-
strictive entity participatory measures allow other taxing entities to col-
lectively veto a TIF plan.243 In 2008, thirty-two states had provided for 
entity participatory measures in their TIF statutes.244 Because taxing 
entities have a strong incentive to maximize the amount of taxes they 
receive, these highly restrictive measures can severely inhibit a URA’s 
ability to adopt a TIF plan unless the plan benefits all affected taxing 
entities.245  Thus, while citizen and entity participatory measures in-
crease equity for residents and taxing entities, this equity comes at the 
expense of efficiency.246 As the amount of control citizens and taxing en-
tities have over plan adoption increases, the ability of a URA to effi-
ciently do its job decreases.247 
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ii. Participatory Mechanisms and Transparency in Idaho 
Although Idaho’s TIF laws have and continue to provide a signifi-
cant amount of citizen participation, the laws do not provide as much 
citizen participation as some other states’ laws. Idaho’s urban renewal 
laws were codified in 1966 with provisions for public hearings before the 
adoption of an urban renewal plan.248 As part of the hearing, the URA 
must “generally identify the urban renewal area covered by the plan.”249 
This requirement effectively combines the hearing for district (area) and 
plan creation. When the Idaho legislature adopted TIF in 1988, the leg-
islature incorporated the requirement for public hearings before plan 
and district approval into Idaho’s TIF laws and added a requirement 
that a public hearing be held before a plan could be amended.250 The 
legislature also included provisions requiring URAs to transmit the TIF 
plan and a description of the TIF district to all affected taxing entities 
before a TIF district is formed.251 There are no provisions for the for-
mation of citizens’ councils in Idaho’s TIF laws.252 While Idaho would 
likely benefit from citizens’ councils that consult with URAs about TIF 
plans at the plan adoption phase, citizens’ councils that have too much 
control over plan adoption will likely inhibit Idaho URAs’ ability to effi-
ciently perform their functions. 
A noteworthy Idaho citizen participatory mechanism is a 2011 
amendment to subsection 50-2006(a) that gives citizens a significant 
amount of control over the creation of urban renewal agencies. The 
amendment requires “a majority of qualified electors, voting in a 
citywide or countywide election . . . [to] vote to authorize [an urban re-
newal] agency to transact business and exercise its powers.” 253  This 
amendment greatly increases the amount of voter participation in urban 
renewal at the project initiation phase. Although the details of plan and 
district formation are still left completely to the discretion of the URA, 
URA formation now requires voter approval.254 While this new require-
ment makes it harder for Idaho municipalities to create urban renewal 
agencies, most of the URAs in Idaho were created before the amend-
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ment255  and citizens are likely to approve a URA where there is a 
need.256 
Although Idaho only has one entity participatory measure, this 
measure still provides for more entity participation than many other 
states that have no such measures.257 The lone Idaho entity participa-
tory measure is found in Idaho Code subsection 50-2906(1), which re-
quires URAs to transmit a description of the TIF district and the TIF 
plan to all affected taxing entities.258 Idaho’s TIF laws do not require 
URAs to consult with or consider the input of the other taxing entities 
involved in a TIF plan.259 With such minimal input, Idaho municipali-
ties run the risk of adopting TIF plans that do not “proportionately 
spread benefits and costs across all affected jurisdictions.”260 By amend-
ing its TIF statutes to encourage or require URAs to consult with taxing 
entities before adoption of a TIF plan, the Idaho legislature would “give 
affected taxing districts some influence over the process, without giving 
them complete veto power, [thus] granting them a measure of input 
without unduly constraining the authorizing body.”261 Such a “balanced 
approach will probably yield the best results in terms of the mix of effi-
ciency, effectiveness, and equity concerns.”262 
The Idaho legislature has also sought to provide oversight for TIF 
projects by including transparency measures in Idaho’s TIF laws.263 The 
first of these measures was added in 2002 and requires URAs to comply 
with Idaho’s public records and open meetings laws.264 The second of 
these measures was added in 2011 and requires each URA to hold a 
public meeting where it reports its “activities for the preceding calendar 
year, which report shall include a complete financial statement setting 
forth its assets, liabilities, income and operating expense as of the end of 
such calendar year,” and takes comments from the public. 265  These 
transparency measures help the public ensure that Idaho URAs are act-
ing efficiently and responsibly. 
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B. TIF Promotes Fiscal Responsibility in Local Government 
Because local government is largely decentralized, municipalities 
must rely heavily on their own resources to finance operations.266 Local 
governments basically have two ways to produce additional revenue for 
financing their operations: they must either raise tax rates, a process 
inhibited by local politics, or “increase the value of taxable resources.”267 
TIF is one of the only tools municipalities have to raise the value of re-
sources subject to taxes.268 TIF does this by leveraging private invest-
ment to bring in new revenue.269 TIF encourages private development, 
which in turn increases property values.270 This increase in property 
values provides additional revenue to municipalities. When TIF bonds 
are paid off and all project costs are provided for, incremental revenues 
produced by the TIF project are no longer allocated to project costs and 
instead revert to the affected taxing entities, “thus generating either 
new revenues or reducing tax rates for taxpayers.”271 This is a major 
selling point for TIF; it allows municipalities to finance their operations 
without seeking additional funds from taxpayers.272 This also goes to the 
very heart of TIF. TIF is self-sustaining, which is attractive to munici-
palities that must answer to taxpayers while providing services and en-
couraging growth.273 
i. Mitigating Unexpected Circumstances 
Although TIF encourages fiscal responsibility and can generally 
produce enough increment to successfully finance all project costs and 
TIF bonds, unexpected economic factors, such as low occupancy rates, 
may prevent TIF projects from catalyzing development, producing in-
crements, and paying off bonds.274 States can anticipate and prevent 
such unexpected factors at the evaluation phase by enacting “legal pro-
visions that require the evaluation of a project’s progress toward meet-
ing the objectives laid out in the enabling ordinance . . . . If problems . . . 
can be identified early in the redevelopment venture, then the authority 
can act to alleviate the problems.”275 In 2001, only nine states had eval-
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uation provisions in their TIF statutes and Idaho was not one of 
them.276 
Idaho currently has no evaluation scheme provided for in its TIF 
statutes.277 Idaho could prevent the risk of TIF projects failing due to 
unexpected circumstances by enacting such a provision.278 Massachu-
setts’s TIF statutes afford an excellent example. Massachusetts requires 
a state Economic Assistance Coordinating Council to “conduct a contin-
ual evaluation of economic opportunity areas and the projects certified 
for participation in the economic development incentive program.”279 
While enacting an evaluation provision would likely help Idaho 
municipalities identify and react to unexpected factors in an urban re-
newal project before the project is finished, it is possible that unsuccess-
ful projects will still go forward. The transparency measures mentioned 
previously280 can help Idaho municipalities learn from the mistakes of 
urban renewal projects that are already completed and mitigate those 
mistakes going forward. 
ii. Screening Unrealistic Expectations 
Another fiscal responsibility problem arises when municipalities 
expect TIF projects to produce revenue for the municipality independent 
of tax increment.281 Although the private development generated by a 
TIF project usually produces additional revenues for cities, those reve-
nues can be offset by TIF projects that are expected to independently 
produce revenues for the city, but fail to do so.282 Thus, even though tax 
increment has provided for all of a project’s costs and bonds, cities are 
forced to subsidize TIF projects that do not produce independent reve-
nue.283 
The Idaho Center is a relevant example of this. Although the Idaho 
Center illustrates a city using TIF to shape a unique development vi-
sion,284 that vision may not have been the best way to stimulate private 
development. As previously noted, the Idaho Center achieved many of 
its development goals. After the Idaho Center was completed, many 
businesses settled nearby and property taxes surrounding the Idaho 
Center increased eight fold.285 However, the Idaho Center itself has nev-
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er become a self-sustaining investment. Practically every year since 
opening, the Idaho Center has produced net losses. Those losses totaled 
$394,425 in 2000; $537,408 in 2001; $507,116 in 2002; $774,755 in 
2003;286 $1,084,743 in 2007; $1,363,426 in 2008; $1,208,499 in 2009; 
$696,486 in 2010; $1,764,897 in 2011; $1,569,294 in 2012; and 
$1,803,634 in 2013.287 
The Idaho Center benefits analysis, which was published in 2004, 
noted, “[T]he Nampa events complex persistently continues to lose mon-
ey, requiring an annual operating subsidy from the Urban Renewal 
Agency.”288 The analysis attributes the Idaho Center’s poor performance 
to market conditions: 
Market conditions facing the events business have not been fa-
vorable in recent years. Across the nation, more than seventy 
concert venues have been built in the past five years, while the 
number of proven acts on tour—musical performers, circuses, 
family shows—have dropped significantly. Concert promoters 
today are focusing on the largest markets, where 20,000 seat 
“mega-arenas” can sell out at the highest ticket prices. In the 
Pacific Northwest, with economic conditions lagging behind the 
nation’s rebound from recession, many event venues are report-
ing a significant drop in their business. The Idaho Center, along 
with many of its peers, has not been able to run its operation on 
a break-even basis.289 
This benefits analysis was published before the start of the reces-
sion in 2007.290 After the recession was well underway, in 2010, the Ida-
ho Press-Tribune reported that the Idaho Center continued to struggle, 
noting that “‘B market’ entertainment venues” were floundering because 
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“[e]ntertainment dollars are some of the first to dry up in a recession.”291 
Considering the Idaho Center’s failure to produce revenues since its in-
ception, whether the events center will ever produce revenues seems 
questionable. The Idaho Center’s poor performance thus raises the ques-
tion: considering Nampa’s location and size, was an events center a wise 
use of Nampa TIF funds? 
a. Keeping the Public Informed through Plan Requirements 
Where a TIF project fails to meet revenue-production expectations 
for cities, it is important to focus on the positive benefits the project ac-
complishes. While the Nampa URA likely hoped the Idaho Center would 
bring in revenue, it was probably more focused on the morale it would 
inspire in the community, the economic development it would catalyze, 
and the effect it would have on property taxes.292 Its goals in these areas 
were largely met.293 However, critics will still condemn projects that do 
not produce revenues as expected.294 States can mitigate this criticism 
at the plan formulation phase by requiring urban renewal plans to (1) 
conform to existing community plans, (2) include precise descriptions of 
the planned uses for the TIF district, and (3) provide estimates of project 
costs.295 Such elements will inform the public about the feasibility of the 
plan and help them decide whether the plan will complement the com-
munity. 
A TIF plan should state “the objectives of the redevelopment pro-
ject and should reflect the interests and existing plans of the community 
as a whole.”296  These interests can be gleaned from existing master 
community plans.297 Master community plans typically expound matters 
necessary to community development such as “aspects relating to zon-
ing, densities of residential and commercial properties, [and] the provi-
sion of affordable housing.” 298  URAs should use master community 
plans to ensure that their TIF projects will complement the community, 
rather than offend it.299 In 2001, at least thirty-two states required TIF 
plans to conform to master community plans.300 Moreover, plans that 
include the project costs of and specify the planned uses in a TIF area 
will further ensure that TIF projects complement the community.301 Re-
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quiring inclusion of these elements in an urban renewal plan will en-
courage urban renewal agencies to plan according to public need.302 If 
the plan is not acceptable, the inclusion of these elements, with the help 
of the citizen participatory measures described earlier, will help spark 
“the public debate on the appropriateness of the public expenditure” and 
screen those plans that fail to garner public support.303 If a community 
supports an urban renewal plan from the outset, it will be more likely to 
condone its failings. 
b. Plan Requirements in Idaho 
Compared to other states, Idaho’s TIF laws have fairly restrictive 
plan requirements.304 Idaho’s TIF laws have required urban renewal 
plans to conform to existing community plans, include precise descrip-
tions of the planned uses for the TIF district, and provide estimates of 
project costs since the Local Economic Development Act was passed in 
1988.305 Several subsections of Idaho Code make up Idaho’s requirement 
that urban renewal plans conform to master community plans.306 Idaho 
Code subsections 50-2905(2) and (4) contain Idaho’s requirement that 
urban renewal plans include project costs and specify the planned uses 
for a project area.307 
In addition to the plan requirements listed above, the Local Eco-
nomic Development Act has always required that urban renewal plans 
contain an economic feasibility study (Idaho’s only resemblance of a “but 
for” requirement), fiscal impact statement, and description of how the 
URA will finance project costs.308 The Idaho legislature added two more 
requirements in 2002. These additions were the result of the legislature 
setting a time limit on urban renewal projects in 2000.309 The additions 
require that urban renewal plans include the project’s termination date 
and a “description of the disposition or retention of any assets of the 
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agency upon the termination date.”310 In 2011, the Idaho legislature 
added yet another requirement: that urban renewal plans include the 
assessed value of the project area at the beginning of the project year 
and the assessed value of all taxable property in the municipality.311 
This requirement allows municipalities to confirm that an urban renew-
al area is blighted at the outset of a project and that development within 
an area is stimulating the tax base in comparison to the rest of the city 
as a project goes forward. 
While these requirements, taken together, certainly help inform 
communities about the desirability of an urban renewal plan, some of 
the requirements are undefined, which makes it difficult to know if the 
requirement has been met. For example, Idaho Code does not define 
what the standard for conformance with master community plans is.312 
This essentially leaves the interpretation of whether a TIF plan con-
forms with a master community plan to each individual URA. Further-
more, subsection 50-2905(2) only requires “[a] statement listing the 
kind, number, and location of all proposed public works or improve-
ments within the revenue allocation area.”313 URAs are allowed to make 
their descriptions as general or specific as they desire. Finally, as previ-
ously mentioned, the statute does not describe what an economic feasi-
bility study is, thus making the only resemblance of a “but for” standard 
in Idaho’s TIF laws a fairly easy hurdle to cross. Setting a standard for 
these requirements will take the interpretation of whether TIF plans 
meet the requirements out of the hands of URAs, thus increasing the 
public’s ability to screen impractical or incompatible projects. 
C. TIF Plays Off of Local Government Competition 
TIF’s ability to generate financing for local government projects can 
create or intensify competition between local government jurisdic-
tions.314 This competition comes in two forms: between adjoining com-
munities vying for regional development and between URAs and taxing 
entities vying for tax increments.315 
i. Between Adjoining Communities 
Because TIF helps local governments attract businesses, thus in-
creasing the tax base and providing for local services, bordering com-
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munities often use TIF as a bargaining chip.316 Indeed, “TIF adoption is 
frequently a copycat phenomenon, with a municipality more likely to 
implement a TIF program when other municipalities in the vicinity 
have done so.”317 The existence of TIF plans in a municipality can be the 
difference between a thriving development community and a stagnant 
one. 318  Thus, where one local government implements TIF projects, 
neighboring governments are sure to follow in order to maintain an even 
playing field.319 This competition has partly driven the success and pro-
liferation of TIF.320 Even if a local government has no desire to use TIF, 
if its neighboring communities are using TIF, it may be inclined to do 
so.321 While this is an important aspect of why TIF is successful, it is 
rarely a source of controversy. It is hard for a neighboring community to 
complain about losing private investment to its counterparts using TIF 
when it generally has an equal ability to use TIF.322 
ii. Between Taxing Entities 
TIF also promotes competition between overlapping taxing entities, 
such as fire districts, counties, and school districts, which resent the al-
location of tax increments to URAs in a TIF district.323 While the compe-
tition that TIF promotes between nearby communities is not controver-
sial, competition between taxing entities is one of the most controversial 
aspects of TIF and promotes distrust and infighting, which ultimately 
hinders the realization of entities’ and URAs’ goals.324 As previously ex-
plained, TIF works by setting a base value that continues to go to the 
various taxing entities.325 As property tax values in the TIF district in-
crease, any property tax revenues that exceed the set base value go to 
the URA to fund improvements.326 These increments are often quite 
large.327 Although the increments are eventually returned to the entities 
when the project closes, entities often feel entitled to these funds while 
projects remain open.328 The taxing entities that most often feel slighted 
by the formation of a TIF area are school districts.329 An Illinois study 
found that TIF formation “appears to have created an atmosphere of 
mistrust between school districts and municipalities.”330 
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A timely Idaho example of such mistrust is a recent lawsuit be-
tween Nez Perce County and the City of Lewiston’s URA. The dispute 
arose after Lewiston’s URA had finished all the work in a TIF plan and 
all plan costs were provided for.331 Idaho Code subsection 50-2909(4) 
requires that when a TIF 
area plan budget . . . estimates that all financial obligations 
have been provided for . . . and the agency has determined no 
additional project costs need be funded through revenue alloca-
tion financing [TIF], the allocation of revenues . . . shall there-
upon cease; any moneys . . . in excess of the amount necessary to 
pay such principal and interest shall be distributed to the affect-
ed taxing districts . . . .332 
The URA’s budget for the coming year showed that increment had 
provided for all the costs of the plan.333 The county filed a writ of man-
damus to compel the URA to close the two areas in the plan and return 
any excess funds to the taxing entities.334 A writ of mandamus compels a 
government entity to perform acts it has a clear legal duty to perform.335 
The county argued that, although the plan was still within the twenty 
years allotted for it by Idaho Code section 50-2904, because all the work 
in the plan was completed and the budget provided for all future plan 
costs, Idaho Code subsection 2909(4) imposed a ministerial duty on the 
URA to either close the areas in the plan and distribute any money in 
excess of the amount needed to pay for remaining plan costs or amend 
the plan to include more projects.336  Any incremental revenues that 
were still accruing for the plan would revert back to the county and oth-
er taxing entities.337 
Rather than closing the areas, the URA wanted to rebate some of 
the excess funds and keep the areas open until it could determine if in-
crement was needed to fund projects the URA wanted to add to the 
plan.338 Idaho Code subsection 50-2903(5) states in part: 
An agency shall, by September 1 of each calendar year, adopt 
and publish . . . a budget for the next fiscal year. . . . For the fis-
cal year that immediately predates the termination date for an 
urban renewal plan . . . the agency shall adopt and publish a 
budget specifically for the projected revenues and expenses of 
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the plan and make a determination as to whether the revenue 
allocation area can be terminated before the [sic] January 1 of 
the termination year . . . .339 
The URA asserted that, according to subsection 50-2903(5), termi-
nation of an urban renewal area before the twenty-year time limit is 
discretionary, not ministerial, and thus the county’s writ must fail.340 
According to the URA, if a URA determines that an area should be ter-
minated it should publish a specific termination budget for the coming 
year.341 Because the agency had discretion to terminate the area and to 
create a specific termination budget, and it did not do either, the URA 
asserted that it could keep the areas open and continue to collect tax 
increments until it made such findings or the twenty years allotted for 
the urban renewal plan expired.342 Furthermore, the URA asserted that 
because several subsections in title 50, chapters 20 and 29 provide that 
an urban renewal plan may be amended anytime in the twenty years 
allotted for a plan, the URA had discretion to add new projects to the 
plan anytime before the conclusion of the twenty-year time limit.343 
The district court held that the URA was allowed to keep the areas 
open.344 The county filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration 
in December 2013; however, that motion was denied in February 2014 
and the county has not sought any further action.345 
a. Reducing Tension between Taxing Entities and URAs through 
Financial Management Restrictions 
Nez Perce County’s actions display the tension that TIF can create 
between local governing entities.346 This tension hinders the realization 
of both URAs’ and taxing entities’ goals.347 Although this tension will 
exist practically anytime TIF is used, some states have enacted financial 
management restrictions at the plan implementation phase to limit the 
burden that TIF may impose and provide relief to entities that have a 
greater need for the increments that TIF would normally capture.348 The 
first of these restrictions requires URAs to return excess TIF revenues 
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when a TIF plan is terminated.349 As shown by the Nez Perce County 
case, TIF projects often accrue more increments than are needed to fi-
nance project costs.350 These excess funds should ideally be returned to 
the other taxing entities involved in a TIF project once the project is 
terminated.351 In 2001, at least sixteen states had restrictions requiring 
the URAs to return excess TIF funds.352 The Nez Perce County case also 
displays that, whether these funds should be returned as soon as a TIF 
project is finished and financed is not always clear.353 However, one 
thing is certain, “[a] ‘perpetual’ TIF district was likely not envisioned by 
those seeking to promote current redevelopment in an area.”354 This is 
why many states have set time limits for TIF projects or areas in the 
first place, because “[i]f TIDs are not limited in the period of time they 
may collect diverted taxes, authority members may inappropriately use 
such revenues for purposes not explicitly approved in the capital plan-
ning process.”355 
Another financial management restriction compels URAs to reim-
burse the losses entities may incur in the initial stages of TIF imple-
mentation.356 TIF projects can sometimes cause the assessed value of 
land to fall initially.357 As a result, taxing entities lose the money they 
otherwise would have received had no TIF project been implemented.358 
As Johnson and Kriz note: 
If these “losses” . . . go unreimbursed by the authority in charge 
of redevelopment, then the proposed TIF project is not strictly 
financed through increments. . . . [T]his gets at the very nature 
of TIF. Financing redevelopment in a self-supporting way has 
always been the primary selling point for municipalities seeking 
a technique to redevelop previously blighted areas.359 
Despite the importance of this requirement, only seven states had 
such a requirement in 2001.360 North Dakota’s law provides an excellent 
example. The law provides that after the county auditor certifies any tax 
losses, then, 
[u]pon receipt of any tax increments in the fund, the county 
treasurer, at the times when the county treasurer distributes 
collected taxes to the state and to each political subdivision for 
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which a tax loss has previously been recorded, shall also remit to 
each of them from the tax increment fund an amount propor-
tionate to the amount of that tax loss, until all those tax losses 
have been reimbursed.361 
The final restriction partially or completely exempts school districts 
from surrendering tax increments.362 Because school districts have his-
torically received a bigger portion of property tax revenues, there is of-
ten concern that TIF projects place a greater burden on school districts 
than other taxing entities.363 As a result, some states have exempted 
school districts from TIF projects to some degree or another.364 
b. Financial Management Restrictions in Idaho 
As displayed by the Nez Perce County case, Idaho Code subsection 
50-2909(4) requires URAs to return excess TIF funds at the termination 
of a TIF plan.365 This subsection has been in Idaho’s TIF laws (with mi-
nor changes in 2002366) since they were codified in 1988.367 Idaho’s TIF 
laws in this area are rather restrictive when compared to other states.368 
However, this section could benefit from clarification about whether 
termination before the twenty years allotted for a TIF plan is solely at 
the URA’s discretion or if it can be triggered by completion and financ-
ing of a plan.369 
Idaho’s TIF laws also require URAs to return excess funds for TIF 
plans that go beyond the twenty-year time limit set by section 50-
2904.370  Section 50-2904 creates several exceptions that allow a TIF 
plan to exceed twenty years.371 Subsection 50-2904(5) requires a TIF 
plan that exceeds twenty years under one of these exemptions to return 
revenues exceeding the amount necessary to repay bonds to the various 
taxing entities on a pro rata basis.372 This subsection was enacted in 
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2000,373 the same year the legislature created a time limit for TIF plans, 
which was initially twenty-four years374 but changed to twenty years in 
2011.375 
Idaho is one of the pioneers of school district exemptions.376  In 
2001, just fourteen states had school district exemptions.377 Idaho had a 
partial school district exemption from the time the Local Economic De-
velopment Act was codified in 1988378 until the exemption was removed 
in 2006.379 In 2008, the Idaho legislature created another partial school 
district exemption, which exempted voted-on levies from going to 
URAs.380 School districts have variety of levies, some of which are voted 
and others that do not require a vote.381 The 2008 exemption prevents 
any levies that are voted on from being collected by URAs.382 Because 
the non-voted levies are generally small, Idaho’s school district exemp-
tion prevents school districts from surrendering a substantial amount of 
increment.383 The creation of this exemption was a step in the right di-
rection for Idaho, a state with notoriously low education spending.384 
Idaho does not have any financial management restrictions that 
require URAs to reimburse entities for losses they incur in the initial 
stages of TIF implementation.385 As already noted, reimbursing entities 
for these losses is integral to assuring that TIF is a self-sustaining 
mechanism of financing redevelopment.386 By adding such a require-
ment, the Idaho legislature would ensure that the self-supporting na-
ture of TIF remains a selling point for municipalities using TIF in their 
jurisdictions. 
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D. TIF Encourages Public-Private Collaboration like Contemporary 
Economic Development Efforts 
The last way TIF is similar to local government is in its ability to 
facilitate public-private collaboration. 387  Without private investment, 
TIF would not be a viable way to stimulate economic development. TIF 
depends on private investment to boost the property tax base, thus 
providing increments to pay for projects.388 To woo private investors, 
municipalities often use TIF to construct infrastructure (such as roads, 
sewer lines, parking lots, and lighting) that private investors would 
have otherwise had to pay for themselves.389 Such interaction between 
public and private actors necessarily requires a great deal of collabora-
tion and coordination to accomplish the proposed objectives.390 
An excellent example of public and private actors collaborating 
through TIF for the well-being of an Idaho community is the world’s 
largest yogurt plant that was constructed in Twin Falls by Chobani in 
2012.391 Evidence of this collaboration is in the development agreement 
between the City of Twin Falls, the Twin Falls URA, and Chobani (re-
ferred to as Agro-Farma).392 Several times throughout the agreement, 
the completion of the project is conditioned on the cooperation of the 
parties involved.393 The distinct and essential roles each public and pri-
vate actor played in the agreement emphasize the necessity of each ac-
tor’s cooperation in the successful completion of the project.394 
The agreement required the city to “[c]omplete a public pre-
treatment wastewater treatment system . . . to accommodate . . . com-
pliance with the Industrial Wastewater Discharge Permit” required for 
the plant;395 “cooperate with and assist URA and\or Agro-Farma in ap-
plying for and obtaining all permits and approvals;” and “expedite and 
fast track all such permits, inspections, and approvals.”396 The URA was 
required to cooperate with Agro-Farma “to determine the total invest-
ment to be made by Agro-Farma for the A-F Plant, the tax increment 
funds to be generated by the A-F Plant, and the maximum amount of 
the URA Financing.” 397  This amount was to be a minimum of 
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$17,340,000, which would be used for “property acquisition, site devel-
opment, pretreatment facilities, sewer trunk line improvements, water 
line improvements, power and gas line extensions, . . . [and] other ex-
penses related to the project.”398 In exchange, Agro-Farma agreed to in-
vest at least $128,000,000 and as much as $300,000,000 to build the 
plant.399 Because Agro-Farma decided to expand the plant, the URA’s 
financing ended up being $36,260,927400 and Agro-Farma ended up ex-
pending closer to $450 million on the project.401 
The benefits of public-private collaboration can be seen in the con-
struction of the Chobani plant and its resulting effect on the community. 
Chobani constructed plant in 326 days, and employed 2,000 people to do 
so.402 Chobani estimated it would employ 400 employees at the plant403 
and “for every 10 jobs it create[d] directly, it . . . expected to create 
roughly 66 additional jobs in ancillary businesses.”404 Twin Falls City 
Manager Travis Rothweiler expected that the plant would employ up to 
500 employees once it was running at full capacity.405 Chobani also sup-
ports the local community by purchasing its dairy supply locally.406 All 
in all, the state expected the economic impact of the plant’s business to 
be $1.3 billion.407 Mr. Rothweiler also stated, “The opportunities Choba-
ni has presented are incredible. . . . We’ve seen an 80[%] increase in sin-
gle-family home permits in the last year. I can’t say Chobani is all of it, 
but what they have brought, in terms of that sense of optimism about 
our community, is huge.”408 Obviously, not all TIF projects will produce 
the same effects as the Chobani plant; however, the success of the Cho-
bani plant displays the public benefit a TIF project can provide to the 
community when public and private actors effectively work together. 
Even though the public-private nature of TIF can generate TIF’s 
greatest benefits, it is also seen as one of TIF’s greatest flaws.409 Indeed, 
“TIF is simultaneously popular and controversial because of its central 
role in enabling local governments to work closely with private busi-
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nesses in promoting development.”410 TIF is generally considered a pub-
lic purpose because it is usually tied to urban renewal and alleviating 
blight.411 However, with the relaxation of blight requirements, TIF crit-
ics assert that it is no longer being used for a public purpose because it 
is no longer alleviating blight.412 This is true in predominantly rural 
states, such as Idaho, where traditional definitions of urban blight are 
hard to find.413 What critics refuse to recognize, however, is whether TIF 
is used for development or redevelopment, it provides public benefits 
and is thus a public purpose. Even when TIF is used for development, it 
brings significant benefits to a community. The Chobani plant exempli-
fied this. Jobs, tax revenues, community optimism, and overall economic 
growth are tangible public benefits that are not small potatoes, even for 
Idahoans.414  
Legislatures in at least seventeen states have recognized these 
benefits by eliminating blight as a precondition for the creation of a TIF 
district.415 This approach is not only more intellectually honest,416 but 
some scholars believe that it is also a better use of TIF.417 USC Law Pro-
fessor George Lefcoe asserts, “TIFs depend upon dramatic increases in 
property value and, as a result, are geared more toward new commercial 
investment, often in well-heeled suburban neighborhoods.” 418  Conse-
quently, 
[p]rograms of wholesale blight eradication funded by TIF do not 
work well in stagnant, poorer communities. An optimal TIF pro-
ject is one that can be built quickly, at the highest conceivable 
density and at the greatest fair market value, garnering huge 
retail sales. In places lacking dramatic growth in effective de-
mand for space, property values and tax revenues are not going 
to increase quickly and broadly enough to finance the costs of 
acquisition and redevelopment.419 
While eliminating blight as a precondition for the creation of a TIF 
district may not be necessary in Idaho, Professor Lefcoe’s assertions 
suggest that Idaho should not unduly limit TIF through strict blight 
requirements. 
                                                     
410. Id. at 93. 
411. Lefcoe, supra note 27, at 70–71. 
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i. Providing Public Benefits through Agreements with Developers 
Although TIF projects used for development can rightfully be con-
sidered a public purpose, on the other end of the spectrum, purely devel-
opment- or tax-driven TIF projects can cause local officials to treat TIF 
like a “cash cow” without concern for a project’s ability to bring benefits 
to a community.420 “But for” causation is one way to alleviate such situa-
tions. However, as discussed in part II.B.2., “but for” standards are usu-
ally easy to meet and are not strictly applied. Another way to prevent 
such situations is by requiring private developers to enter into commu-
nity benefit agreements at the plan formulation phase.421 These agree-
ments often include 
specified numbers of new affordable housing units, a commit-
ment to hire local labor first, a developer's commitment to create 
a specified number of jobs at living wages, and job training. “Be-
cause the agreements are negotiated between community coali-
tions and interested developers, the benefits can be tailored to 
meet specific community needs, such as the need for parks, day-
care centers, or job-training facilities.” Community representa-
tives come from the neighborhood and from labor, environmen-
tal, and religious organizations, often assisted by public interest 
lawyers and city staff, and encouraged by elected city officials.422 
Although these agreements are similar to the development agree-
ments that cities often make with private developers (such as the one 
Chobani entered into with the City of Twin Falls and the Twin Falls 
URA), because they are negotiated by community groups, rather than 
city and URA officials, they are more focused on pursuing as much pub-
lic benefit as possible from a given TIF project.423 Community benefit 
agreements “are considered by their supporters to be powerful tools for 
assuring that communities’ needs will not be neglected by large develop-
ers.”424 
ii. Agreements with Developers in Idaho 
Although Idaho Code allows for development agreements between 
cities, URAs, and private developers, these agreements can only be en-
tered into if the private developer is also seeking a rezone. 425  With 
many Idaho TIF projects, private developers are seeking a rezone, and 
URAs are thus allowed to enter into development agreements with the 
                                                     
420. See id. at 94. 
421. Id. at 95–96. 
422. Id. (quoting Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Understanding Community Bene-
fits Agreements, PRAC. REAL EST. LAW. 19, 19 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1157613). 
423. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 422, at 19. 
424. Id. at 20. 
425. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-6511A (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
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developers.426 However, it is possible that a developer would not seek a 
rezone as part of a TIF project, and, accordingly, the municipality in-
volved in the TIF project would not be able to enter into a development 
agreement with the developer. Furthermore, when municipalities are 
allowed to enter into development agreements, the agreements are ne-
gotiated by cities and URAs and thus may not be as publicly focused as 
community benefit agreements, which are negotiated by community 
groups.427 
Idaho Code could profit from a provision that encourages or re-
quires URAs to enter into community benefit agreements with private 
developers that lay out specific public benefits that a private develop-
ment will provide. These agreements would not be conditioned on a re-
zone and, ideally, community groups with the help of public interest 
lawyers and city staff, rather than URAs or cities, would negotiate the 
agreements. Encouraging or requiring URAs to make such agreements 
with private developers would help ensure that TIF in Idaho does not 
become a purely tax-driven mechanism.428 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As discussed earlier, California, the birthplace of TIF, eliminated 
its urban renewal program in 2012.429 Although urban renewal finances 
had yet to be completely wound down in January 2014, the same Cali-
fornia legislators who sought to eliminate the program were already 
writing proposals to revive it, albeit with a different title.430 The most 
ambitious attempt at re-establishment was Senate Bill 1, which would 
encourage “development in transit priority areas, small walkable com-
munities and clean energy manufacturing sites.” 431  Governor Jerry 
Brown, who spurred the elimination of the program and indicated that 
it was too early to reinstate the program in 2013, has even proposed 
creating more modest “infrastructure financing districts” that require 
approval by 55% of local voters.432 Other proponents have sought to by-
pass the capitol altogether by filing an initiative “that would reinstate 
redevelopment agencies with even broader powers, calling them job and 
education development agencies.”433 Whatever the method or form of 
reestablishment, it is clear that California wants urban renewal back.434 
                                                     
426. See Development Agreement, supra note 391, at 10 (requiring the URA to “ob-
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Similar to California, one Idaho community, Nampa, has had a 
fickle relationship with urban renewal. In 2004, the city disbanded its 
URA through an advisory vote.435 Just two years later, the city had cre-
ated a new URA.436 Recently, the city has sought to reduce the role of 
urban renewal within its jurisdiction without actually eliminating its 
URA. The city elected four new city council members in November 
2013.437 The new six-member city council consisted primarily of mem-
bers who were opposed to urban renewal.438 With the new city council in 
place, it voted to replace Nampa’s URA board with the council itself.439 
This unprecedented move was taken to give the council “more control 
over which projects move forward.”440 However, considering most of the 
council members’ opposition to urban renewal, it is questionable wheth-
er any substantial progress will be made on current and future projects. 
Although the council claims to be providing voter accountability for the 
URA, 441  the change in administration seems more like a makeshift 
mechanism for severely limiting urban renewal in Nampa without elim-
inating it completely. 
Efforts such as the Nampa City Council’s seem redundant consider-
ing California’s and Nampa’s histories with urban renewal. These ex-
amples show that even those who criticize urban renewal find that it is 
hard to live without once it is gone.442 This is not only because urban 
renewal fits so well with prominent features of contemporary local gov-
ernment but also because the benefits that urban renewal provides, 
though seemingly intangible while urban renewal exists, become much 
more tangible once it is gone. The Idaho Supreme Court and legislature 
have recognized these benefits by upholding the constitutional and stat-
utory legality of urban renewal.443 Thus, even though highly conserva-
tive local leaders and urban renewal critics may take drastic measures 
to resist urban renewal, as long as it keeps providing these benefits to 
Idaho communities, their efforts will be ineffectual. 
This is not to say that urban renewal does not have shortcomings. 
As this article points out, urban renewal has a turbulent past and there 
are inherent aspects of modern urban renewal that cause it to succeed 
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while simultaneously creating tension in local politics and economics.444 
The way to mitigate these shortcomings, however, is not the elimination 
or severe limitation of urban renewal, but the fostering of a climate in 
which urban renewal can realize its full potential. Idaho can foster such 
a climate by shedding negative associations with urban renewal’s trou-
bled past, recognizing the evolution and beneficial aspects of Idaho’s 
current system, and making efforts to incrementally improve that sys-
tem going forward. 
Spencer W. Holm* 
  
                                                     
444. Supra Parts I, III. 
 * The author would like to thank Meghan Conrad, Ryan Armbruster, Melinda 
Anderson, Professor Stephen Miller, the University of Idaho law librarians, the Idaho Law 
Review, and his wonderful wife, Rachel, for accommodating the publication of this article. 
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V. APPENDIX: The Evolution of Urban Renewal in Idaho* 
 1965i 1988ii 1994 
PROJECT INITIATION  
URA authorization by voters    
PLAN FORMULATION  
Legal Requirements  
Blight finding ✓ ✓ ✓iii 
Explicit “but for” requirement    
Plan Requirements  
Conformance with comprehensive plan ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Specific planned uses  ✓ ✓ 
Project costs  ✓ ✓ 
Community benefit agreements    
Additional requirements  ✓ ✓ 
PLAN ADOPTION  
Hearings Required  
At plan adoption ✓ ✓ ✓ 
At plan amendment  ✓ ✓ 
At district creation ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Additional Participatory Mechanisms  
Transmit plan description to taxing entities  ✓ ✓ 
Consult with citizens’ council &/or taxing entities    
PLAN IMPLEMENTATION  
Tax Increment Management  
Return of excess revenues after 20+ years    
Return mandated when plan terminated  ✓ ✓ 
Losses in initial stages reimbursed    
Partial school district exemption  ✓ ✓ 
EVALUATION  
Regular evaluation during project    
Transparency    
TERMINATION 
Time limits   
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APPENDIX: The Evolution of Urban Renewal in Idaho (continued) 
2000 2002 2005 2006 2008 2011 Present Suggested 
 
      ✓iv ✓ 
 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓v ✓ ✓vi ✓vii ✓ 
       ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓viii ✓ 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ix ✓ 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓x ✓ 
       ✓ 
✓ ✓xi ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓xii ✓xiii ✓ 
 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓xiv ✓ 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓xv ✓ 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓xvi ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓xvii ✓ 
       ✓ 
 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓xviii ✓ 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓xix ✓ 
       ✓ 
✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓xx ✓ 
 
       ✓ 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓xxi ✓xxii ✓ 
 
✓xxiii ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓xxiv ✓xxv ✓ 
 
                                                     
 * This table is based largely on the table that Johnson and Kriz used in their 
2001 publication that surveyed TIF laws across the United States. Johnson & Kriz, supra 
note 3, at 33–35 tbl. 3.1, 45–47 tbl. 3.2. 
 i. Title 50, chapter 20 enacted. Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 246, sec. 
1, § 50-2001, 1965 Idaho Sess. Laws 600. 
 ii. Title 50, chapter 29 enacted. Local Economic Development Act, ch. 210, sec. 1, 
§ 50-2901, 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws 393. 
 iii. (e) added to IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013). Local Eco-
nomic Development Act, ch. 381, sec. 2, § 50-2903(7), 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 1222, 1224 
(codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013)) (adding com-
petitively disadvantaged border areas). 
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 iv. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006(a) (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 v. Agricultural land exempted from IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 & 
Supp. 2013). Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 310, sec. 1, § 50-2018(8), 2006 Idaho 
Sess. Laws 953, 953–54 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 & 
Supp. 2013)). 
 vi. Forestland exempted from IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 & Supp. 
2013). Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 317, sec. 4, § 50-2018(8), 2011 Idaho Sess. 
Laws 910, 916  (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2018(8) (2009 & Supp. 
2013)). (f) added to IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013). Local Economic 
Development Act, ch. 317, sec. 6, § 50-2903(8), 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 910, 920 (codified as 
amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013)) (specifying that deterio-
ration does not include areas “not developed beyond agricultural, or any agricultural oper-
ation”). 
 vii. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2018(8), -2903(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013).  
 viii. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2008(b), (d), (g), -2009, -2018(12)(g) (2009 & Supp. 
2013). 
 ix. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(2) (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 x. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(4) (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 xi. (7) and (8) added to IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905 (2009 & Supp. 2013). Local 
Economic Development Act, ch. 143, sec. 4, § 50-2905(6), (7), 2002 Idaho Sess. Laws 394, 
401 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(7), (8) (2009 & Supp. 2013)) (re-
quiring a termination date (7) and “[a] description of the disposition or retention of any 
assets of the agency upon the termination date.” (8)). 
 xii. (1) added to IDAHO CODE ANN.  § 50-2905 (2009 & Supp. 2013). Local Economic 
Development Act, ch. 317, sec. 8, § 50-2905(1), 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 910, 923 (codified as 
amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(1) (2009 & Supp. 2013)) (requiring a statement 
describing the value of the taxable property in the TIF district and in the municipality). 
 xiii. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2905(1), (3), (5)–(8) (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 xiv. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2008(c) (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 xv. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2906(1) (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 xvi. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2008(c) (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 xvii. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2907 (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 xviii. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904(5) (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 xix. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2909(4) (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 xx. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2908(1)(f) (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 xxi. (c) added to IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006 (2009 & Supp. 2013). Idaho Urban 
Renewal Law of 1965, ch. 317, sec. 1, § 50-2006(c), 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 910, 912 (codi-
fied as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006(c) (2009 & Supp. 2013)) (requiring a pub-
lic meeting to present yearly report). 
 xxii. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2006(c), (e) (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
 xxiii.  24-year time limit added to IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904 (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
Local Economic Development Act, ch. 275, sec. 2, § 50-2904, 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws 893, 
896–97 (codified as amended at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904 (2009 & Supp. 2013)). 
 xxiv. 24-year time limit changed to 20-year time limit. Local Economic Development 
Act, ch. 317, sec. 7, § 50-2904, 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 910, 923 (codified as amended at 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904 (2009 & Supp. 2013)). 
 xxv. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-2904 (2009 & Supp. 2013). 
